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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—0000O0000

REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public entity,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah
corporation; and TERRY
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a
Jewelers & Loans,

Case No. 880302-CA

Defendants and Appellants,
and
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public entity,

Case No. 880292-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.? BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS. ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop;
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a
Jewelers & Loans and Sales, Inc.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.
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COURT OF APPEALS

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON PRESIDING
Brant T. Wall
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Appellants/
Defendants Daskalas &
Pantelakis
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-8220

John T. Evans
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Respondents/
Defendants Burge,
Barrows, and Barrows
310 South Main St. #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 521-6383

Jerome H. Mooney
Kyle Treadway
Attorneys for Appellants/
Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn
Shop, Anderson, and Pantelakis
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-5635

Harold A. Hintze
Olsen, Hintze, Nelson & Hill
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Respondent Redevelopment Agency
of Salt Lake City
3319 No. University Ave. #2 00
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (810) 359-3510

William D. Oswald
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Respondent Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City
57 West 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 521-7751

B. Ray Zoll
Attorney for neighboring
owners
5251 S. Green Street, #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 262-1500
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of Salt Lake City
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The Defendants/Respondents Juanita Irene Burge, Robert D.
Barrows, Jr., and Beatrice Irene Barrows (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the "owners"), by and through their attorney of
record, John T. Evans, hereby answer the Petition for Rehearing of
the Defendants/Appellants Ellen K. Daskalas, individually and dba
The Pawn Shop, Terry Pantelakis individually and dba AAA Jewelers
&

Loans, Inc.

(hereinafter

collectively

referred

to

as the

"tenants"), dated November 9, 1989, on file herein, pursuant to
request of the Court dated November 24, 1989.
POINT I
THE TENANTS HAVE NO COMPENSABLE RIGHT
REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE "DATE OF
TAKING11 OCCURRED
Normally the date of service of Summons is the date fixed for
valuing the property rights being acquired by condemnation.

This

is not a hard and fast rule, however, but only sets forth a
presumption subject to change if it would result in an unfair or
unjust award.

The date of valuation has been determined to be

seven and one-half years subsequent to the filing of the Summons
as a result of delay

in the proceedings.

Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).

Utah

State Road

"Courts have also

set valuation dates prior to the service of Summons when the value
of condemned property not initially included in the area to be
condemned has been diminished

by the condemnation

of nearby

properties pursuant to the planned condemnation of a large area."
Id. at 830.

Our Supreme Court has also held that the conduct of a party
can amount to a waiver of their right to have damages assessed on
the date of service of Summons,

In Oregon S.L. & U.N.Ry. v,

Mitchell, 7 Utah 505, 27 P.693 (1891), summons was served on a
trustee in deed of trust, then later the fee owner entered an
appearance and waived Summons.

The owner argued that the date of

valuation should be the date Summons issued against the trustee.
The court held that the owners waived that right when they entered
their appearance.

The above cases are particularly instructive

to the question as to the date of take and valuation.

Where the

tenants could have terminated immediately, but instead voluntarily
chose to remain in possession under their original contract rents,
thereby reaping the benefit of any bonus value during the remaining
13-month term without interruption, it would be unfair and unjust
to hold that the date of valuation should still be the date of
service of Summons as contended by the tenants.

Their act of

remaining in possession constituted a waiver by them of having
their leasehold interest valued as of the date of service of
summons.

As long as they remain in possession, their interest in

the real property remained undisturbed
condemnation action.

and unaffected by the

The time of valuation would not be from the

date of service of the Summons, but from the time when possession
is taken, which in the instant case was not until after the lease
had

expired.

Since there was no renewal of the

lease and

possession was retained by the tenants under the contract rents,
they had no right to claim a bonus value whether as of the date of
2

service of Summons or otherwise.

Gafnev Press, Inc. v. State,

(1954) 206 Misc 1070, 135 NYS 2d 512 (attached hereto as exhibit
"A") .

The opinion of this court that the time of taking is the

time possession is taken is not contrary to the provisions of
Section 78-34-11 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended).
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Bradley, 205 Kan. 242, 468 P.2d
95 (1970), does not support the tenants' position that compensable
leasehold rights were taken on the date of service of Summons
because it appears that the right of possession is concurrent with
the date of take.

Tenants quote from the dissenting opinion to

the effect that the tenants continued in possession for one and
one-half months of their remaining 24 years after the taking date,
but the majority opinion adopted the findings of the trial court
to the effect that no interest remained in the property by anyone
after the date of taking on March 9, 1966.
The complete and entire right, title and
interest of the plaintiff, lessee, and the
landlords1 entire estate in the leased premises
were taken on March 9, 19 66, and all their
respective interests therein were extinguished.
Id. at 98.
Phillips

does

confirm

that

"the

right

of

the

lessee

compensation, as any other right, may be waived . . . "

to

(Id. at

98) , which is certainly what the tenants did in the instant case
when they elected to remain in possession for the remainder of
their lease.
The whole basis for Phillips is that the tenants1 right to
compensation is fixed when the tenant no longer has a lease:
3

It is the very general rule that the taking of
an entire tract of land under lease by eminent
domain abrogates the relation of landlord and
tenant. Id. at 98.
A valid taking of the whole premises, which
divests the lessors title, terminates a lease.
. . o

Id. at 99.

In the instant case, there was no change in the landlord/
tenant relationship which existed between the parties at the time
Summons was served.

This change only occurred after the lease

expired by its terms and the tenants were occupying on a month-tomonth basis.

The reason the relationship continued is because

under Utah law the filing of a condemnation action vests no rights
in the condemnor until after it obtains an order of occupancy
(Section 78-34-9) or obtains a final judgment of condemnation
(Section 78-34-15).

Since neither of these events occurred, the

landlord/tenant relationship continued unrestricted, unlike the
Phillips

case where there was a taking

relationship.

that terminated

the

In the instant case, the tenants cannot claim they

had a right to damages from the date of service of Summons when
they knew that by staying in possession of the property they
suffered no loss or damage.
Tenants argue that they had a right to an evidentiary hearing
to determine the value of their bonus rights under the lease. The
trial court did give the tenants a full evidentiary hearing on the
issue of whether the tenants had any bonus rights and the trial
court correctly found that the only right to compensation they
would have would be for improvements, if any, they placed on the

4

property. Since the tenants remained in possession under the lease
at contract rents for the remainder of the lease term and there was
no renewal thereof, there was no reason to grant the tenants a
hearing on the value of leasehold rights.

They already received

that value. The trial court did grant tenants the right to appear
at trial and put on evidence concerning any improvements placed
thereon by the tenants, but no evidence of any such improvements
was ever forthcoming.

The tenants simply failed to appear at the

hearing on this issue, thereby waiving their rights to assert the
same at this time.
Tenants cite Almota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Company v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470, 35 LEd 2d 1, 93 S. Ct. 791 (1973), in
support of their argument that an evidentiary hearing "should have
been accorded tenants to present evidence as to the fair market
value of the existing leasehold interest."
for Rehearing).

(Page 8 of Petition

In Almota, however, the hearing was held because

a bonus value did exist which needed to be quantified.
instant case, no bonus value existed.

In the

Contrary to tenants1

assertion, there was no option to renew the lease in Almota, as
clarified by the Court's statement that the issue of the case was:
Whether, upon condemnation of a leasehold, a
lessee with no right of renewal is entitled to
receive as compensation the market value of its
improvements without regard to the remaining
term of its lease, because of the expectancy
that the lease would have been renewed.
(Emphasis added.) Id. 409 U.S. at 473
It is appropriate for this Court to determine in this case
that the time of the taking is when the condemning authority
5

actually takes possession of the leasehold property, but whether
it is determined that the date of valuation is when the Summons was
served or when possession was taken frc>m the tenants is not
material because in either event the fact that the tenant remained
in possession during the term of the lease at the contract rent
indicates they have no bonus value to claim and no purpose would
be served by holding a hearing for the purpose of quantifying the
amount of such non-existent value.
POINT II
THE OWNERS HAVE A RIGHT TO BE AWARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Tenants assert that even though they did not prevail in their
claim for a bonus value they should not be required to reimburse
the owners for the expenses caused

in defending

against the

tenants' claim, because such claims were "warranted" as shown by
the Almota case.

In Almota, the court allowed evidence of the

possibility that a lease might be renewed, therefore, the tenants
assert they also were justified in making a similar claim for bonus
value due to the possibility of renewal.

However, the claim

asserted in Almota was not similar to the tenants' claim in the
instant case.

Almota allowed evidence of the possibility of a

lease renewal to show the value of improvements placed on the
property by the lessee. In the instant case, however, the tenants
presented no evidence that they placed improvements on the property
so the valuation of such improvements is not an issue.

6

In the instant case the only basis the tenants would have to
make a claim for bonus value due to extension of a lease is if they
had a right to extend at below market rents thereby creating a
bonus value.

Almota did not allow evidence of an extension for

that purpose nor did the tenants have any valid claim due to a
right to extend at below market rents because the lease provided
that any extension would be granted only at newly renegotiated
rents, and certainly such rents would reflect market conditions.
So Almota does not stand for the proposition that the defendant
could claim a bonus value arising out of a possible renegotiation
out of a lease nor did the case involve any interpretation of an
attorney's fee clause in the lease. The tenants1 claim for a bonus
value based on a possible renewal simply was without merit.
Even if the tenants felt they had a valid claim, if they do
not prevail they must bear the burden of reimbursing the owners
for their expenses under the attorney's fee clause of the lease.
The tenants seem to want to apply some good faith test as a basis
for any award against them for attorney's fees, but the lease makes
no such allowance.

Its intention is to reimburse the owners if

they are required to incur expense as a result of conduct by the
tenants contrary to the lease terms. Misguided intentions, however
well meaning, are not defenses to their obligations under the
attorney's fee provision.
The tenants are not being penalized for filing an Answer that
protects their rights in the event they had a valid bonus value.
That did not cause the owners to incur expenses.
7

Expenses were

caused by the tenants1 pursuit of an award for a non-existent bonus
value and most of those expenses were incurred through litigation
with the tenants occurring after the remaining 13 month lease
period expired and tenants were in possession on a month-to-month
basis.
The tenants were not just protecting any potential claims in
filing a responsive pleading. They went further and asserted that
as of the filing of the Answer, while still in possession of the
property paying the contract rent, they had an immediate right to
an amount greater than 100% of the approved appraisal deposit with
the Court. Their assertion of the right to the money has continued
from that point until the present filing of the Petition for
Rehearing, notwithstanding that they were allowed to complete their
lease term uninterrupted.

This unfounded

demand

caused

the

freezing of the funds on deposit with the court and necessitated
that the owners defend against such claims at a trial on the issue
of whether the tenants held any bonus value, and expenses were
incurred by the owners as a result and continue to be incurred by
the owners.
None of the attorney's fees payable by the tenants under the
terms of the lease were incurred in determining the amount to be
awarded to the respective parties.

The fees were incurred to

defend against the tenants1 claim that they had any right to share
in the award of just compensation. The question is not whether the
tenants have a right to assert their claim, the question is whether
the owners have a right to be compensated when the tenants fail to
8

establish such claim asserted pursuant to the lease. The leasehold
provisions do not require that any distinction be made as to
whether the tenants' claims were asserted in good faith. The fact
that the claims were denied does indicate that they were without
merit and, therefore, subject to the attorney's fee provision of
the lease.
POINT III
THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER TRIAL
REQUIRED AS TO THE ISSUE OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL
Under Section IV of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, it
appears that there is a misunderstanding

that the amount of

attorney's fees awarded at the trial level was based upon the
submission of affidavits only and not based on a trial.

As a

result of this mistaken impression this court ordered that since
the tenants contested the amount of fees they are entitled to a
trial on that issue. The fact is that a trial already held on that
issue and should not need to be duplicated.
An evidentiary hearing was held on May 28, 1987, at which time
Mr. Wall had the opportunity to present evidence and conduct crossexamination pursuant to his request for a special setting for that
purpose. At the time of the hearing, however, Mr. Wall decided to
simply submit the matter on affidavit following his argument.

It

was at the conclusion of that hearing that the court awarded the
sum of $9,000.00. These facts are set forth on pages 11-12 of the
Brief of Respondent's Burge, Barrows & Barrows dated March 31,
1988, on file herein, containing the citations to the record on
9

appeal, and states in part as follows:
Subsequent to the trial a hearing was held
on March 25, 1987, to rule on various motions,
including the amount of attorney's fees that
should be awarded the owners.
At that
hearing, evidence was admitted as to the amount
of time which had been incurred by the owners1
attorney in connection with the tenants' claim,
the necessity of incurring those hours and the
reasonableness of the amount of the fees
incurred. This evidence was set forth in the
owners' Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees
From Tenants [footnote] which was admitted into
evidence by Stipulation of the parties, subject
to Mr. Wall's right of cross-examination and
without prejudice to his argument that
attorney's
fees should not be awarded
[footnote].
At the hearing the Court
authorized the owners to submit an additional
Affidavit regarding attorney's fees and ruled
that the tenants could have a further hearing
on the matter to present evidence as to the
issue of attorney's fees and to afford the
tenants their right of cross-examination
[footnote].
On April 6, 1987, the owners
submitted their Supplemental Affidavit in
Support of Attorney's Fees From Tenants
primarily summarizing the "record" [footnote]
following which Mr. Wall set the matter for
evidentiary hearing to be held on May 28, 1987.
At that time, Mr. Wall filed his Affidavit,
[footnote] but no further evidence was
introduced and no cross-examination of the
tenants' attorney was sought. The matter was
argued and submitted on the Affidavits. At the
conclusion of that hearing, the Court awarded
the sum of $9,000.00 attorney's fees to be paid
by the tenants, as noted above, and inserted
that amount as part of the Order and Judgment,
which was then entered [footnote].
Inasmuch as a trial was held following submission of the
Affidavits specifically at the request of tenants of which this
Court was apparently not aware, at which the tenants were afforded
the right of cross-examination and to put on other evidence, it is
submitted that any additional trial as to the issue of the award
10

of $9,000.00 would be redundant and an unnecessary burden upon the
trial court.
CONCLUSION
A just and fair award of compensation for a leasehold in
which

the

tenants

remained

in

possession

would

require

a

determination of value as of the date possession was actually taken
rather than date of service of Summons, and by remaining in
possession the tenants waived their right to have their leasehold
valued as of service of Summons.

It is not material whether the

valuation of the leasehold interest was as of service of Summons
or loss of possession because in either case the tenants lost no
bonus value so there was nothing to vest on either date.

Even if

the tenants had a right to be compensated for the 13 months
remaining under the lease term, it received the benefit of that
right because they remained in possession under the contract rent
thereby losing no bonus value and no extension of that lease
occurred.

Without a bonus value there is no reason for a hearing

to determine amount other than the hearing concerning the value of
improvements which the tenants were afforded but failed to attend
or otherwise make a proffer.
The tenants have asserted and continue to assert claims and
demands to share in the proceeds of the condemnation long after
remaining in possession during the full term of the lease and it
is for this action, not for the filing of the Answer, that the
tenants are required to compensate the owners for the expenses they
have incurred.

The tenants are not being penalized for asserting
11

a valid claim, but for asserting a right to a bonus value during
the same period they remained in possession and for an alleged five
year extension to which they have no rights. Since tenants' claims
were not valid, the Owners should be compensated for defending
against them.

Tenants are not being penalized for trying to show

the amount of just compensation, but for having no right to just
compensation whatsoever.
No further trial as to the award of $9,000.00 attorney's fees
incurred at the trial level should be held and the Court of
Appeals' decision ordering remand for that purpose should be
modified and such award of $9,000.00 be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of December, 1989.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

- - rdl/r

--'lie?

John T. Evans
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents Burge, Barrows
^fid Barrows
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the
Respondent/Defendant's Answer to Petition for Rehearing to be
mailed to the following counsel of record on the 8th day of
December, 1989:
Brant T. Wall
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Appellants/
Defendants Daskalas &
Pantelakis
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-8220
Jerome H. Mooney
Kyle Treadway
Attorneys for Appellants/
Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn
Shop, Anderson, and Pantelakis
23 6 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-5635

Harold A. Hintze
Olsen, Hintze, Nelson & Hill
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Respondent Redevelopment Agency
of Salt Lake City
3319 No. University Ave. #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (810) 359-3510

William D. Oswald
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Respondent Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City
57 West 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 521-7751

B. Ray Zoll
Attorney for neighboring
owners
5251 S. Green Street, #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 262-1500
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practice as well as upon a course of conduct or other evidence which
clearly demonstrates that there is no issue of substance to be tried.
W e think the court at Special Term correctly granted judgment for
plaintiff. Under the form of pleading asserted by the plaintiff and the
factual theory set forth in its moving papers and upon which the judgment rests, the adjudication will not be deemed to prejudice a subsequent
assertion by defendant of a right to recover under the terms of its contract upon showing its own due performance of the conditions undertaken ; and such a right is conceded by plaintiff on the argument of the
appeal.
The effect of the judgment presently entered, although on its face an
absolute adjudication of rights between the parties, is that until proof
has been adduced by defendant that the pounds have been delivered,
plaintiff is entitled to the return of the dollars paid for the pounds.
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
Judgment and order unanimously affirmed with costs.
Order filed.
(O

* KIT NUMIER SYSTEM>
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The GAFNEY PRESS, Inc., Claimant v. The
STATE of New York.
Court of Claims of New York.
Dec. 2, 1934.
Action for damages for appropriation of leased premises by State.
The claimant moved for order amending or vacating the judgment. The
Court of Claims, Charles T. Major, J., held that claimant suffered no
loss during period that it continued on premises after appropriation, paying same rent to State as it had paid under lease to lessor, and damages
could only be computed from time of removal.
Motion denied.
1. Eminent Domain <^=3200
In action for appropriation of lessee's leasehold interest by State,
claimant had obligation to show loss as basis for damages.
2. Eminent Domain (^=3147
Where leased premises are appropriated, lessee's damage is computed by ascertaining the value of the unexpired portion of the lease on
the appropriation date, less reserved rent, plus the value of irremovable
fixtures, equipment and other appurtenances.

EXHIBIT.

A

GAFNEY PRESS *
Citeasl35N.Y.S.2&TE

iJEminent Domain <S=»147

513

g l Where, after appropriation of claimant
mrniant was allowed to continue on for thneho!d interest by State
wing State same rent as paid under lease, tPths before removal'
Jffirig three months period, and damages were tent suffered no loss
^removal.
mputed from date
»
piscock, Cowie, Bruce, Lee & Mawhinney, Syra
aid Henley, Syracuse, of counsel.
or claimant
Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Atty. Gen., Harold S. Coyne,
rthe State.
*ty. Gen.,
VJOR, Judge.
iThis is a motion made on behalf of the claimant for an orde*
ftacating the findings, conclusions and judgment, on the g n n «
'"contain an error and mistake in the computation of the pe t
fich claimant is entitled to damages.
he decision in the above entitled claim, which was filed on Septe
?19S4, contained the following findings:
10. There remained a balance of 48 months on said lease from t
e'of the appropriation to the date of termination thereof."
Mi

15. The lease of the claimant had 45 months to run from the date
noval on July 1, 1953 to the expiration of said lease on March 31,

57."
P*

18. As a result of the appropriation herein by the State of New
4c, the claimant was evicted from its leased premises and the value of
lease which had 45 months to run was destroyed to its damage in the
of $6075 00/'
t is the contention of the claimant that damages should be aw arded
the date of appropriation,—April 1, 1953, instead of July 1, 1953,
date on which claimant vacated the premises.

Jl] It is undisputed that, after the appropriation date, the claimant
dearrangements with the State of New York to continue in possession
[the leased premises and paid the agreed rental therefor until the date
?removal. Damage is based on loss, and it is claimant's obligation to
low such loss. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189,
7S.Q. 459, 54 L.Ed. 725.
||2] The general rule is that the damage is computed by ascertaining
jyalue of the unexpired portion of the lease on the appropriation date,
(reserved rent, plus the value of irremovable fixtures, equipment and
appurtenances. Schreiber v. Chicago & Evanston R. R. Co., 115
1340, 3 N.E. 427; Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. An?«• ltt N.Y.S 2d—33

5U
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drews, 52 Cal.App. 788, 205 P. 1085; Bernagozzi v. Mitchell Realty Co.,
Inc., 133 Misc. 594, 232 N.Y.S. 666; Bacorn v. People, 195 Misc. 917,
88 N.Y.S.2d 628.
In the Schreiber case [115 111. 340, 3 N.E. 430] above cited, the Court
held:
"It is not reasonable that a party should ask to be compensated for the loss of an unexpired term when, in fact, he has had
the full enjoyment of his entire term * * * "#
In Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Andrews, supra, the
Court commented in 52 Cal.App. on page 793, 205 P. on page 1087:
"An anomalous and unbearable condition would be presented
if, under that rule, the public could be required to pay for a
leasehold interest not taken, but which the lessee held unmolested to the end of the term".
[3] For three months after the appropriation, an amicable arrangement existed herein between the State and the claimant, whereby the
claimant continued to occupy the premises and pay the same rent to the
State as paid to the original owner. Claimant suffered no loss for this
period. The value of the unexpired term of claimant's lease on the date
of the appropriation must be reduced by the value of the time which
claimant occupied the premises pursuant to the new arrangement Therefore, the damage should be computed from the date of claimant's removal. Schreiber v. Chicago & Evanston R. R. Co., supra; City of Cincinnati v. Schmidt, 14 Ohio App. 426; Los Angeles County Flood Control
District v. Andrews, supra.
No reason existed requiring the State to counterclaim on this point.
Under the arrangement, no rent remained to be paid.
Although the above cited cases do not apply to damages for a portion
Of the unexpired lease, they hold substantially that where the tenant occupied and enjoyed the premises during the balance of the term of the
lease after the appropriation date, he would not be entitled to compensation for a leasehold interest not actually surrendered. The same logic
should apply to a part-time occupancy by agreement.
The claimant, having made arrangements with the State of New York
for the occupation of the leased premises, is entitled to damages from the
date of removal.
The motion herein is denied.
Submit order accordingly.

